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Quota-based fairness mechanisms like the so-called Rooney rule or four-fifths rule are used in selection
problems such as hiring or college admission to reduce inequalities based on sensitive demographic attributes
(gender, ethnicity, etc.). These mechanisms are often viewed as introducing a trade-off between selection
fairness and utility (i.e., the overall quality of the selected candidates). In recent work, however, Kleinberg and
Raghavan [Proc. of ITCS ’18] showed that, in the presence of implicit bias in estimating candidates’ quality, the
Rooney rule can in fact increase the utility of the selection process (beyond improving its fairness).
We argue that even in the absence of implicit bias, the estimates of candidates’ quality from different groups
may differ in another fundamental way, namely, in their variance. We term this phenomenon implicit variance
and we ask: can fairness mechanisms be beneficial to the utility of a selection process in the presence of
implicit variance (even in the absence of implicit bias)? To answer this question, we propose a simple model
in which candidates have a true latent quality that is drawn from a group-independent normal distribution.
To make the selection, a decision maker receives an unbiased estimate of the quality of each candidate, with
normal noise, but whose variance depends on the candidate’s group. We then compare the utility obtained
by imposing a fairness mechanism that we term γ -rule, which includes demographic parity (γ = 1) and the
four-fifths rule (γ = 0.8) as special cases, to that of a group-oblivious baseline selection algorithm that simply
picks the candidates with the highest estimated quality independently of their group. Our main result shows
that the demographic parity mechanism always strictly increases the selection utility, while any other γ -rule
also always increases it weakly. We extend our model to a two-stage selection process where the true quality is
observed at the second stage and analyze how our results are changed in that case. We finally discuss multiple
extensions of our results, in particular to different distributions of the true latent quality.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Discrimination in selection and the role of implicit bias. Many selection problems such
as hiring or college admission are subject to discrimination [5], where the outcomes for certain
individuals are negatively correlated with their membership in salient demographic groups defined
by attributes like gender, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation or religion. Over the past two decades,
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implicit bias—that is an unconscious negative perception of the members of certain demographic
groups—has been put forward as a key factor in explaining this discrimination [15]. While human
decision makers are naturally susceptible to implicit bias when assessing candidates, algorithmic
decision makers are also vulnerable to implicit biases when the data used to train them or to make
decisions was generated by humans.
To mitigate the effects of discrimination on candidates from underrepresented groups, various
fairness mechanisms1 are adopted in many domains, either by law or through softer guidelines. For
instance, the Rooney rule [11] requires that, when hiring for a given position, at least one candidate
from the underrepresented group be interviewed. The Rooney rule was initially introduced for
hiring American football coaches, but it is increasingly being adopted by many other businesses in
particular for hiring top executives [6, 24]. Another widely used fairness mechanism is the so-called
4/5-rule [17], that requires that the selection rate for the underrepresented group be at least 80%
of that for the overrepresented group (otherwise one says that there is adverse impact). This rule
is part of the “Uniform Guidelines On Employee Selection Procedures”2. A stricter version of the
4/5-rule is the so-called demographic parity constraint, which requires the selection rates for all
groups to be equal. An overview of these and other fairness mechanisms can be found in [17].
Fairness mechanisms, however, have been the subject of frequent debates. On one hand, they
are believed to promote the inclusion of deserving candidates from underrepresented groups who
would have otherwise been excluded in particular due to implicit bias. On the other hand, they are
viewed as requiring consideration of candidates from underrepresented groups at the expense of
candidates from overrepresented groups, which may potentially decrease the overall utility of the
selection process, i.e., the overall quality of selected candidates.
Formal analysis of fairness mechanisms in the presence of implicit bias. Perhaps surpris-
ingly, the mathematical analysis of the effect of fairness mechanisms on utility in the context
of selection problems was initiated only recently by Kleinberg and Raghavan [19] (see also an
extension to ranking problems in [7]). The authors of [19] assume that each candidate i has a true
latent qualityWi that comes from a group-independent distribution. They model implicit bias by
assuming that the decision maker sees an estimate of the quality Wˆi =Wi for candidates from the
well-represented group and Wˆi =Wi/β for candidates from the underrepresented group, where
β > 1 measures the amount of implicit bias. The factor β is unknown (as it is implicit bias) and the
decision maker selects candidates by ranking them according to Wˆi . Then Kleinberg and Raghavan
[19] show that, under a well-defined condition (that roughly qualifies scenarios where the bias is
large), the Rooney rule improves in expectation the utility of the selection (measured as the sum of
true qualities of candidates selected for interview). This result contradicts conventional wisdom that
fairness considerations in a selection process are at odds with the utility of the selection process.
Rather, it formalizes the intuition that, in the presence of strong implicit bias (which makes it hard
to compare candidates across groups), considering the best candidates across a diverse set of groups
not only improves fairness but it also has a positive effect on utility.
The phenomenon of implicit variance and its role in discrimination. In this paper, we
identify and analyze a fundamentally different source of discrimination in selection problems than
implicit bias. Even in the absence of implicit bias in a decision maker’s estimate of candidates’
1These mechanisms are sometimes termed “positive discrimination” (e.g., in Germany, France, China, or India) or “affirmative
actions” (in the USA), often referring to their justification as corrective measures against discrimination suffered in the past
by disadvantaged groups. In our work, we analyze the effect of these mechanisms in a particular setting of selection problems
(with implicit variance) independently of their motivation, hence we use the more neutral term “fairness mechanisms.”
2A set of guidelines jointly adopted by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the Civil Service Commission, the
Department of Labor, and the Department of Justice in 1978.
quality, the estimates may differ between the different groups in their variance—that is, the decision
maker’s ability to precisely estimate a candidate’s quality may depend on the candidate’s group.
There are at least two main reasons for group-dependent variances in practice. The first arises from
candidates: different groups of candidates may exhibit different variability when their quality is
estimated through a given test. For instance, students of different genders have been observed to
show different variability on certain test scores [4, 23]. The second arises from the decision makers:
decision makers might have different levels of experience3 judging candidates from different groups
and consequently, their ability to precisely assess the quality of candidates belonging to different
groups might be different. For instance, when hiring top executives, one may have less experience
in evaluating the performance of female candidates because there have been fewer women in those
positions in the past (in France for instance, there was only one woman CEO amongst the top-40
companies in 2016-2020). The quality estimate’s variance might also change from one decision
maker to another. For example, in college admissions, recruiters might be able to judge candidates
from schools in their own country more accurately than those from international schools.
We term the above issue with quality estimates ‘implicit variance’ as decision makers are often
unaware of their group-dependent variances. We posit that implicit variance is an omnipresent
and fundamental feature affecting selection problems (including in algorithmic decision making).
Indeed, having different variances for the different groups is mostly inevitable and hardly fixable,
while estimating these variances can be a difficult task (and variance is indeed ignored in many
algorithms). In this paper, we model the implicit variance phenomenon by assuming that the
decision maker sees of an estimate of the quality of a candidate Wˆi that is equal to the candidate’s
true latent qualityWi plus an additive noise whose variance depends on the group of the candidate.4
In this situation, a natural baseline decision maker to consider is the group oblivious selection
algorithm that simply selects the candidates with the highest estimated quality, irrespective of their
group, to maximize the selection utility. The group oblivious selection algorithm represents not
only a decision maker unaware of the implicit variance in their estimates, but also a decision maker
determined to not use group information.5
Unfortunately, our analysis shows that in the presence of implicit variance, group oblivious
selection can lead to underrepresentation of groups with lower-variance quality estimates compared
to groups with higher-variance quality estimates. One natural way to address this representation
inequality would be to adopt fairness mechanisms proposed to address discrimination in selection
such as the ones discussed above; but this poses the same question that was investigated by
Kleinberg and Raghavan [19] in the case of implicit bias: what is the effect of fairness mechanisms
on the quality of a selection in the presence of implicit variance?
Our model and overview of our results. To answer this question, we propose a simple model
of implicit variance with two groupsA and B: for each candidate i , the decision maker gets a quality
estimate Wˆi =Wi +σGi εi , whereGi is the group to which the candidate belongs and εi is a standard
normal random variable. The estimator is unbiased but has a variance σ 2Gi that depends on the
candidate’s group. We assume that the true quality comes from a group-independent distribution—
assumed normal in our analytical results. In the one-stage selection problem, the decision maker
then selects a fraction α1 (called selection budget) of the candidates.
3Or different amounts of data in case of algorithmic decision making.
4This noise may be a property of the decision maker getting a noisy perception of the candidate’s quality or a property of
the candidate (i.e., the variability in the candidate’s performance).
5If a decision maker knows the group-dependent variances, then they could use the variances together with group
information of the candidates to optimize utility, see the Bayesian-optimal algorithm below.
Using this model, we first observe that, for any selection budget α1 , 1/2, the group oblivious
selection algorithm (our baseline without fairness mechanism) leads to a smaller selection rate—i.e.,
to underrepresentation—for one of the two groups: the low-variance group if α1 < 1/2 (the most
common case) and the high-variance group if α1 > 1/2. Then, we investigate how the utility of the
group oblivious baseline is affected when imposing a fairness mechanism. Specifically, we study a
generalization of the 4/5-rule that we call γ -rule, which imposes that the selection rate for a given
group is at least γ times that of the other group for some parameter γ ∈ [0, 1]. This includes both
the 4/5-rule (γ = 0.8) and demographic parity (γ = 1) as special cases.
Our main result shows that for the one-stage selection problem with any selection budget,
beyond giving a more fair representation, demographic parity strictly improves the selection utility
(measured by the expected quality of a selected candidate). Moreover, the γ -rule with any γ < 1
yields a utility strictly lower than demographic parity but still weakly higher than the group-
oblivious algorithm. We then consider a two-stage selection process. There, a pre-selection is
first made based on the quality estimates. Then the true quality is observed for each pre-selected
candidate and the selection is refined to meet a lower second-stage budget α2. This can model
hiring decisions where one first makes a short list based on CV and then refines the selection after
interview; or grant selection processes that often happen in two stages with only an extended
abstract at first stage and then a full proposal at the second stage. In this two-stage selection process,
we show that demographic parity strictly improves the selection quality if the first-stage budget is
close enough to the second-stage budget (i.e., one does not interview too many more candidates
than slots available) or if the first-stage budget is large; but that it may hurt in between—although
much less than the gain in the other regimes. As above, the same holds (but weakly) for the γ -rule
with other values of γ . Finally, through numerical simulations, we show that our analytical results
can be extended in particular to cases where the latent quality distribution is not normal.
Overall, our results show that fairness mechanisms can increase utility in selection problems
with implicit variance and freed of any bias. In practical scenarios, one may (at least currently)
encounter both implicit bias and implicit variance in decision making, and we do not claim that
our main takeaway generalizes to those situations. Similarly, if the baseline decision maker is not
group oblivious, fairness mechanisms may not increase utility. Finally we remark that in selection
problems with implicit variance, the key characteristic of a group is high- vs low-variance, not
minority vs majority. In such problems, the group oblivious algorithm often overrepresents the
high-variance group. If the high-variance group corresponds to a minority of candidates, this may
seem counter-intuitive. We stress however that (i) this corresponds to a group oblivious baseline
without bias (which might not match certain practical scenarios); and (ii) our model does not require
that the higher-variance group corresponds to a minority group. We argue that the opposite case is
equally interesting in practice (in particular when the implicit variance arises from the candidates).
Related works. There is an abundant literature on fairness in machine learning, in particular on
(one-stage) classification, that tackles the question of how to learn a classifier while enforcing some
fairness notion in the outcome [8, 12, 16, 20, 22, 25, 28, 29]. In this literature, fairness is usually seen
as a constraint that reduces the classifier’s accuracy and the fairness-accuracy tradeoff is analyzed.
In contrast, in our work, we examine selection problems in which fairness can improve utility.
Selection also differs from classification by the presence of selection budgets (i.e., maximal number
of class-1 predictions), which changes the problem significantly.
The problem of selection is considered in [19] under the presence of implicit bias [15]. In their
work, the authors study the Rooney rule [11] as a fairness mechanism and show that under certain
conditions, it improves the quality of selection. An extension of the Rooney rule is studied under a
similar model in [7], where the authors investigate the ranking problem (of which the selection
problem can be seen as a special case) also in the presence of implicit bias and obtain similar results.
In both papers, simple mathematical results expressing conditions under which the Rooney rule
improves utility are obtained in the limit regime where the number of candidates is very large. We
use the same limit regime in our work but, in contrast, we do not consider that there is implicit bias
and introduce instead the notion of implicit variance to capture the difference in precision of the
quality estimate for different groups. Although our model can easily be extended to incorporate
implicit bias as well, we purposely restrict it to the simplest possible form of implicit variance
so as to show its effect on the selection problem independently of bias. Implicit bias, or simply
bias (possibly from an algorithm trained on biased data) in the evaluation of candidates quality
is certainly a primary factor of discrimination; but it is also one that may reasonably be fixable
through the use of algorithms combined with appropriate debiasing techniques and ground truth
data [27] (e.g., by learning fair representations of data [21, 30]).
In our work, we also consider the 4/5-rule [17] (or rather an extension of it that we call the γ -rule
and that includes demographic parity) rather than the Rooney rule. The main difference between
the two is that the 4/5-rule imposes a constraint on the fraction of selected candidates from the
underrepresented group whereas the Rooney or its extension in [7] imposes a constraint on the
number of selected candidates from the underrepresented group.
The two aforementioned papers [7, 19] essentially analyze one-stage selection, whereby the
utility is the sum of the utilities of selected candidates. In practice, many selection problems are
done in two stages where the first-stage selection is refined in a second stage with access to finer
information. A few recent papers specifically analyze the two-stage setting. In [18], a two-stage
college admission and hiring procedure is considered. The authors study if certain fair policies—
irrelevance of group membership and equal opportunity—can be satisfied. They show that it is
possible to satisfy both if the college grades are not reported to the employer, but there are settings
where these fairness conditions cannot be satisfied even in isolation. In [13], the authors study an
optimal multistage selection. They propose two fairness notions for the multistage setting: local
(per stage) and global (final stage) fairness and study their trade-off, the price of local fairness. They
show that this price is bounded and is dependent on the timing of the sensitive feature revelation
(e.g., gender): the later the sensitive feature is given, the lower the price is. The model that the
authors consider assumes an optimal selection procedure that requires knowledge of the data
generation procedure. In contrast, in our work, we study selection procedures that do not require
knowledge of the data distribution and analyze when imposing a fairness mechanism at the first
stage leads to an improvement of the utility of the selection after the second stage.
Fairness mechanisms has been a subject of a number of studies in the economic literature, in
particular from empirical data. In [10], the authors study whether affirmative actions can remove
stereotypes about a particular population. In [3], an empirical evaluation of the influence of
affirmative actions in recruiting is performed and it is shown that it can bring quality together with
equality. Our work complements those studies through a theoretical model that leads to analytical
results on the effect of fairness mechanisms in the presence of implicit variance. The model of
observed quality in this paper is similar in spirit to the model of statistical discrimination in [2, 26],
but in contrast to those works we assume that the decision maker does not know the distribution
parameters and the discrimination happens for a different reason.
2 THE MODEL
We consider the following scenario. A decision maker is given n candidates, out of which a subset
is selected. Each candidate i ∈ {1, · · · ,n} is endowed with a true latent qualityWi . The qualitiesWi
are drawn i.i.d. from an underlying probability distribution that is group-independent but unknown
to the decision maker. For our analytical results and unless otherwise explicitly specified, we assume
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Fig. 1. Probability density function of the true latent qualityW and the estimated quality Wˆ .
that this distribution is a normal distribution of mean µW and variance σ 2W > 0. The goal of the
decision maker is to maximize the expected quality of the selected candidates: E [∑i ∈selectionWi ].
2.1 The implicit variance model
We assume that the set of candidates can be partitioned in two groups: group A and group B. There
are nA candidates from group A and nB = n − nA candidates from group B. We refer to them as
A-candidates and B-candidates. When making the selection decision, the decision maker has access
to an unbiased estimator of the true quality. We denote the estimator of the quality of candidate i
by Wˆi . We assume that the variance of the estimator depends on the group: for a candidate i that
belongs to group Gi ∈ {A,B}, its estimated quality is
Wˆi =
{
Wi + σA · εi if i is an A-candidate,
Wi + σB · εi if i is a B-candidate, (1)
where εi is a centered random variable from Normal(0, 1)—the standard normal distribution, of
mean 0 and variance 1. The variables εi are assumed i.i.d..
Without loss of generality, in the rest of the paper we assume that σ 2A > σ
2
B , that is that the
quality estimate has higher variance for group A. We note that none of our results require that A is
also the minority group, i.e., that nA < nB . It is possible to think of scenarios where the minority
group has lower variance in cases where the difference in variances arises from the candidates. In
the example of students tests scores (see Section 1), for instance, one could potentially observe that
males have greater variability in topics in which they are in majority. If the difference in variances
arises from the decision-maker and has a statistical nature, however, the minority group (for past
selections) will have higher variance due to less data points to build the estimator. Throughout
the paper, we refer to this difference in variance as implicit variance because we assume that the
decision maker does not know the variance of the estimators: it is an unconscious phenomenon.
Also, note that a different estimator, having access to different data, will have different implicit
variances for the two groups. Fig. 1 illustrates the resulting distribution of quality estimates for
groupsA and B for different distributions of the true latent quality (by abuse of notation, we denote
by WˆA a variable that has the same distribution asWi + σAεi and similarly for B).
2.2 One-stage and two-stage selection problems
Candidates are selected in a one-stage or two-stage process. In the first stage, for each of the
candidate i , the decision maker observes the quality estimate Wˆi as well as its group Gi ∈ {A,B}.
They then selectm1 candidates out of those n. The selection process stops here if the selection has
only one stage. If the process has two stages, the decision maker observes the true qualityWi of
them1 candidates that were selected at first stage. They select them2 candidates having the largest
Wi among thosem1 candidates. We remark that whenm1 =m2, the two-stage selection process
reduces to the one-stage selection process.
2.3 Selection algorithms
The goal of the decision maker is to maximize the expected quality of the selected candidates. Since
the true qualityWi is observed at second stage, the natural selection at second stage is to sort the
candidates according to their qualityWi and to select the bestm2. For the first stage, the situation
is different because the decision maker only has access to an estimator of the quality Wˆi whose
variance depends on the candidate’s group. In this paper, we compare the following first-stage
selection algorithms to show that fairness mechanisms can improve the selection quality.
Group Oblivious. AsWˆi is an unbiased estimator ofWi whose variance is unknown to the decision
maker, themost natural first-stage selection rule is to sort the candidates according toWˆi irrespective
of their group and to keep the bestm1. We call this the group oblivious selection. This selection
algorithm might be seen as a fair treatment because the selection does not use the group label. Yet,
because of our implicit variance model, this might lead to discriminate against high-variance or
low-variance groups. We will discuss that in Lemma 3.1.
4/5-rule andγ -rule. Let us denote by xA (and xB ) the fraction of theA-candidates (andB-candidates)
that are selected at first stage. The group oblivious selection might favor one group or the other,
that is xA ≫ xB or xB ≫ xA. To mitigate the inequality, the decision maker can introduce selection
quotas. One example is the well studied Rooney rule [19] that states that at least one candidate
from each group should be chosen. Another example is the four-fifths rule [17] that imposes that
xA ≥ 45xB and xB ≥ 45xA. In this paper, we consider a generalization of this rule that is parametrized
by γ ∈ [0, 1]. We say that a selection is γ -fair if
xA ≥ γxB and xB ≥ γxA. (2)
In practice, this is easily done by sorting A- and B-candidates separately. Indeed, by using that
xA ≥ γxB and xB ≥ γxA, the total number of candidates selected at first stage satisfies
m1 = xAnA + xBnB ≤ xAnA + xA
γ
nB = xAnA
nAγ + nB
nAγ
, and m1 ≤ xBnB nBγ + nA
nBγ
.
This means that to satisfy (2), the selection algorithm picks the best estimated ⌈m1γnA/(nB+γnA)⌉ A-
candidates and the best estimated ⌈m1γnB/(nA+γnB )⌉ B-candidates. Then, the remaining positions
are filled with the best estimated among the remaining candidates, irrespective of their group. Note
that when γ = 0, the γ -fair algorithm reduces to the group oblivious algorithm.
Demographic parity. When γ = 1, the γ -fair algorithm corresponds to the classical notion of
demographic parity [28] that mandates that the selection rates be equal across different groups. Note
that because nA, nB andm1 are integer variables, it might be impossible to satisfy the constraints
in (2) when γ is too close to 1. In such a case, we say that an algorithm is γ -fair if the constraint (2)
is satisfied up to one candidate.
Bayesian optimal. We will compare the performance of the above selection algorithms with the
performance of what we call a Bayesian-optimal selection algorithm. This algorithm is an idealized
selection algorithm that knows all the parameters of the problem (the quality distribution and the
variances σ 2A and σ
2
B ) and chooses the candidates in order to maximize the expected quality at final
stage. Recall that our model assumes that the decision maker does not know the quality distribution
W nor the variances of the estimator σ 2A and σ
2
B . Hence, this Bayesian-optimal algorithm is not
implementable in practice; we will use it as an upper bound of what could be achieved.
Note that while the previous algorithms are oblivious to what happens in the second stage, the
Bayesian-optimal selection does depend on the fraction of candidates selected at second stage, α2.
2.4 Simplification of the selection problem for large n andm
In the remainder of the paper, we study the selection problem when the number of candidates is
large. That is, we assume that there exist fixed fractions 0 ≤ pA ≤ 1 and 0 < α2 ≤ α1 ≤ 1 such that
nA = ⌊pAn⌋ m1 = ⌊α1n⌋ m2 = ⌊α2n⌋,
and let n grow. Our theoretical results are obtained in the limit where n goes to infinity (similarly
to [7, 19]). In Section 5.3 we will show numerically that our results for n = ∞ continue to hold for
finite selection sizes. Note that pA represents the fraction of A-candidates in the population while
α1 and α2 represent the global selection ratios (or budgets) at first and second stage respectively.
As we prove below, characterizing the performance of a selection problem is simpler when the
number of candidates n is infinite because a selection algorithm is characterized by three selection
thresholds θˆA, θˆB and θ as follows. The thresholds θˆG ’s correspond to the first stage selection and
the threshold θ corresponds to the second stage selection: if i is aGi -candidate, they will be selected
at first stage if Wˆi ≥ θˆGi . They will pass both stages if Wˆi ≥ θˆGi andWi ≥ θ . For given thresholds
θˆA, θˆB and θ , we denote the expected utility of the corresponding selection byV(θˆA, θˆB ,θ ):
V(θˆA, θˆB ,θ ) = E
[
Wi |Wˆi ≥ θˆGi ,Wi ≥ θ
]
.
For these given thresholds θˆA, θˆB ,θ , the fractions of selected candidates are P(Wˆi ≥ θˆGi ) after the
first stage, and P(Wi ≥ θ ,Wˆi ≥ θˆGi ) after the second stage. Using the above definition, we denote
by U(xA) the expected utility of a threshold-type selection algorithm that selects A-candidates
with probability xA at the first stage and that satisfies the selection size constraints in expectation:
U(xA) = V(θˆA, θˆB ,θ ), where θˆA, θˆB ,θ are such that

P(Wˆi ≥ θˆA |Gi = A) = xA,
P(Wˆi ≥ θˆGi ) = α1,
P(Wˆi ≥ θˆGi ,Wi ≥ θ ) = α2.
(3)
Note that combining the first two constraints in (3) immediately gives that such an algorithm
selects B-candidates with probability xB = (α1 − xApa)/(1 − pA). Hence it is sufficient to describe
the algorithm with xA.
The above definition of expected quality is not directly applicable to the selection algorithms
presented in Section 2.3 because those algorithms are defined neither in terms of fraction of selected
candidate nor in terms of thresholds. In fact, for a given selection algorithm, the fractions of
selected A- and B-candidates depend on the realizations of the random variables representing the
quality (Wi ) and the estimated quality (Wˆi ). As a result, these fractions (xA and xB ) are random
variables. For instance, if because of randomness the A-candidates are evaluated much worse than
the B-candidates, then xA will be 0 for the group oblivious algorithm. The following proposition
shows that when the population is large, these random fluctuations disappear. It shows that, when
n is large, the performance of the various algorithms are simply characterized by xA.
Proposition 2.1. For any problem parameters and any of the first stage selection algorithms
presented in Section 2.3,
(1) there exists a deterministic fraction xA ∈ [0, 1] such that the fraction of A-candidates that are
selected by the algorithm converges (in probability) to xA as n grows;
(2) there exist deterministic thresholds θˆA, θˆB ,θ such that the expected utility of this algorithm
converges toV(θˆA, θˆB ,θ ).
Sketch of Proof. The above result is essentially a direct consequence of the law of large
numbers. By the Glivenko-Cantelli theorem, the empirical distribution of the estimated qualities of
the G-candidates converges to the distribution of WˆG as n →∞. This shows that taking the best
⌊npAxA⌋ A-candidates or taking all A-candidates above the xA-quantile of the distribution WˆA is
asymptotically equivalent as n →∞. The same argument can be used to show that second stage
selection is asymptotically equivalent to selecting all candidates above a given threshold. □
In what follows, we will study directly the model when the population n is large. We denote by
respectively xoblA , x
γ -rule
A , x
dp
A , and x
opt
A the asymptotic fraction of A-candidates that are selected at
first stage for the group oblivious, the γ -fair, the demographic parity and the Bayesian-optimal
algorithms. Moreover, we will denote the expected performance of the various algorithms by
Uobl = U(xoblA ); Udp = U(xdpA ); Uγ -rule = U(xγ -ruleA ); Uopt = U(xoptA ).
For a finite n, characterizing precisely the utility of an algorithm like group oblivious is computa-
tionally difficult due to the correlations between the selection of the different agents. Proposition 2.1
allows us to greatly simplify the study of the performance of the various heuristics because the func-
tionU, defined in Equation (3), depends only on one parameter xA, and is simpler to characterize
than the expectation over a finite number of candidates n.
Summary of the notation. To simplify the exposition, and since candidates are interchangeable,
in the remainder of the paper, we will omit the subscript i and write directlyW and Wˆ for the
quality and the estimated quality of a given candidate. Our notation is summarized in Table 1.
Table 1. Summary of notation.
pG fraction of G-candidates, nG/n, for G ∈ {A,B}
σ 2W variance of latent qualityW
σ 2G implicit variance of estimated quality Wˆ given group G ∈ {A,B}
xG fraction of G-candidates that are selected at first stage
θˆG threshold for G-candidates at first stage
θ threshold at second stage
α1, α2 fractions of candidates selected at stages 1 and 2 (or budgets)
U expected selection quality
ϕ, Φ, Φc , Φ−1 pdf, cdf, complementary cdf and quantile of Normal(0, 1)
3 ONE-STAGE SELECTION
We start our study with the simplest case: one-stage selection. In this setting α2 = α1, which means
that the decision maker observes the values of Wˆ and makes a selection that is final, i.e., no further
subselection is performed after observing the exact values ofW . This type of selection is the most
commonly studied in the related work, see for instance [7, 19].
In this section, we compare the first-stage selection algorithms that we introduced in Section 2.3.
Themain result of this section is that using anyγ -fair algorithm increases the performance compared
to using the group-oblivious algorithm. To show this, we start by describing key properties of the
one-stage algorithms in Section 3.1. The main result is then stated and proven in Section 3.2.
3.1 Behavior of the different first-stage selection algorithms
Group oblivious. This algorithm sorts the candidates according to the estimates Wˆi ’s and selects
the candidates having the highest estimates, regardless of their group. The decision maker does not
distinguish between A- and B-candidates and treats them equally. This corresponds to applying
the same threshold for the two groups, i.e., θˆA = θˆB . Due to different variances of estimation, this
might lead to selecting more people from one group or the other.
Recall that we assume that σA > σB . This means that the distribution of Wˆ has more extremes
for an A-candidate. Thus, if the selection size is small, more A-candidates will be selected compared
to B-candidates because the probability to estimate an A-candidate as a “genius” is higher than for
B-candidates. In contrast, if the selection size is large, the chance of estimating an A-candidate as
bad is larger than for B-candidates, in which case the decision maker selects a lower fraction of
A-candidates. This can be formally stated as follows.
Lemma 3.1 (Group oblivious Selection). When using the group oblivious selection algorithm,
the fractions xoblG of selected candidates from each group satisfy:
(1) if α1 < 1/2, then xoblA > xoblB ;
(2) if α1 > 1/2, then xoblA < xoblB ;
(3) if α1 = 1/2, then xoblA = xoblB = 1/2.
Proof Sketch. The selection fraction xG is by definition the probability that a G-candidate
has a value of Wˆ larger than θˆG . As σA > σB , one has P(Wˆ ≥ µW + x |A) > P(Wˆ ≥ µW + x |B)
and P(Wˆ ≥ µW − x |A) < P(Wˆ ≥ µW − x |B) for any x > 0. This implies that xoblA > xoblB if
α1 < 1/2 and xoblA < xoblB if α1 > 1/2. Since the distribution of qualityW is symmetric, then one has
xoblA = x
obl
B = 1/2 when α1 = 1/2. The proof is detailed in Appendix B.1. □
γ -rule. An algorithm that satisfies the γ -rule is a variant of the group-oblivious algorithm that
guarantees a minimum selection rate for each group. A straightforward computation shows that an
algorithm satisfies both the γ -rule conditions of (2) and the size constraint xApA+xB (1−pA) = α1 if
and only if xA ∈ [ α1pA+pB/γ ,
α1
pA+pBγ
]. By our definition of Section 2.3, the γ -rule selection algorithm
is the algorithm that is the closest to the group-oblivious algorithm while respecting the γ -rule.
Thus, the fraction of A-candidates selected at first stage of the γ -rule selection algorithm is
x
γ -rule
A = min
(
α1
pA + pBγ
,max
(
xoblA ,
α1
pA + pB/γ
))
.
Demographic parity. Contrary to the group oblivious selection algorithm, this algorithm applies
different thresholds for the two groups to preserve the demographics. Since the selection size is
fixed to α1 and both selection fractions are equal, then xdpA = x
dp
B = α1. Thus, if the selection size α1
is small, the demographic parity selection algorithm increases the threshold θˆA for A-candidates by
removing extremes and filling other places by B-candidates. If the selection size is large, it lowers
the threshold for A-candidates by supporting the ones that were removed from the selection.
Formally, using the properties of normal distributions, we can write that for a fixed α1, a G-
candidate with estimate Wˆ is selected if Wˆ ≥
√
σ 2W + σ
2
GΦ
−1(1 − α1) + µW . Recall that in our
regime with n = ∞, the thresholds θˆA and θˆB are the estimates of quality of the worst A- and
B-candidates that are selected. Then, with the demographic parity selection algorithm, we have
(θˆA − µW )/(θˆB − µW ) =
√
σ 2A + σ
2
W /
√
σ 2B + σ
2
W .
Bayesian-optimal selection. Since (W ,Wˆ ) is a bivariate normal, then using the property of condi-
tional expectation, the expected quality of candidate given its estimate is
E(W |Wˆ = wˆ) = σ
2
W
σ 2G + σ
2
W
wˆ +
(
1 − σ
2
W
σ 2G + σ
2
W
)
µW . (4)
The above expression corresponds to the expectation of the posterior distribution ofW given Wˆ .
This expectation is Wˆ if σ 2G = 0 (i.e., there is no noise) and converges to µW when σ
2
G →∞.
In one-stage selection, the Bayesian-optimal selection algorithm picks the candidates with
the highest posterior quality expectation (4). This means that the thresholds θˆG , which are the
estimations of quality of the worst selected A- and B-candidates, satisfy (θˆA − µW )/(θˆB − µW ) =
(σ 2A + σ 2W )/(σ 2B + σ 2W ). This shows that when the number of candidates to be selected is small
(α1 < 1/2), the Bayesian-optimal selection is even more conservative than the demographic parity
selection: it imposesmore strict constraints on the high variance groupA if selection is for candidates
having estimated qualities higher than the median. We state the results in the following lemma.
Lemma 3.2 (Bayesian-optimal Selection). When using the Bayesian-optimal one-stage selection
algorithm, the fraction of A- and B-candidates selected, xoptA and x
opt
B , satisfy
(1) if α1 < 1/2, then xoptA < xoptB ;
(2) if α1 > 1/2, then xoptA > xoptB ;
(3) if α1 = 1/2, then xoptA = xoptB = 1/2.
Proof Sketch. To study the Bayesian-optimal selection, we express the utilityU as a function
of xA. The key difficulty is to compute the first and second derivatives ofU with respect to xA. Then,
using Harris inequality [14], we show thatU is strictly concave. Hence the root of the equation
d U
dxA
= 0 gives the optimal threshold θˆG . The expression for the thresholds allows us to compare the
values of xoptA and x
opt
B depending on selection size α1. The full proof is given in Appendix B.2. □
The behavior of these algorithms is illustrated in Fig. 2. We plot the result for a small selection
size (α1 < 0.5); the situation for α1 > 0.5 is symmetric. We observe that when the selection size
is small, the group oblivious algorithm selects many more A-candidates than B-candidates. In
order to select the same fraction of candidates from both groups, the demographic parity selection
algorithm uses a higher threshold for the high-variance candidates. The γ -rule selection algorithm
(for γ = 0.8, which corresponds to the 4/5 rule) is between the group oblivious and demographic
parity selection algorithms. We also observe that the Bayesian-optimal selection algorithm is even
more conservative and selects fewer A-candidates than the other algorithms.
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Fig. 2. Illustration of the fraction of selected candidates at first-stage (α1 < 0.5).
In Fig. 3, we plot the expected utilityU(xA) as a function of the fraction of selectedA-candidates.
We compare different values of selection sizes α1 ∈ {0.15, 0.35, 0.6, 0.8}. As stated in the proof of
Lemma 3.2, this function is concave and its maximum is attained in xoptA . In this figure, we also
plot the γ -fair regions for γ = 0.8 (4/5 rule). To satisfy the γ -rule (2), the fraction xoblA selected by
the group-oblivious selection algorithm should suffer a correction such that the corresponding
selection fraction will lie on the boundary of the γ -region, if it is outside of it.
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Fig. 3. One-stage selection: UtilityU(xA) as a function of selection probability xA. The function is concave
and attains its maximum in xoptA . The parameters are µW = 1, σW = 1, pA = 0.4, σA = 3, and σB = 0.2.
3.2 Fairness mechanisms improve selection quality
In our work we ask the following question: can fairness mechanisms be beneficial to the utility
of a selection process? A positive answer is given in the following theorem where we show that,
for one-stage selection, demographic parity always increases the average quality of a selection
compared to the group oblivious algorithm. Our result also shows that the softer γ -rule lies between
the group oblivious and demographic parity selection algorithms.
Theorem 1 (Fairness Mechanisms Improves Selection Utility). For the one-stage selection
problem and for any α1 , 1/2, the demographic parity selection algorithm provides a larger utility than
aγ -rule selection algorithm withγ < 1, which in turns provides a larger utility than the group-oblivious
selection algorithm:
Udp > Uγ -rule ≥ Uobl .
The above inequality is an equality when α1 = 1/2.
Proof. Fig. 3 is a good illustration of this proof. As the selection size is equal to α1, we have
xApA + xBpB = α1. By using the results in Lemma 3.1 and Lemma 3.2, this implies that:
• When α1 < 1/2, we have xoptA < xdpA = α1 < xγ -ruleA ≤ xoblA . We observe that in Fig. 3ab.
• When α1 > 1/2, we have xoptA > xdpA = α1 > xγ -ruleA ≥ xoblA . We observe that in Fig. 3cd.
The results then follow from the concavity ofU proven earlier. □
Demographic parity helps the selection utility by reducing the effect of implicit variance, but it
is also interesting to see how large this performance gap can be. In Fig. 4, we show the obtained
utilitiesU, the selection fractions xA and the gap values (Udp −Uobl )/Uobl for different budgets
α1 from 0.01 to 0.99. Fig. 4a illustrates the utilities corresponding to different selection algorithms.
We observe that demographic parity outperforms group oblivious selection, which corresponds to
the result of Theorem 1. We also observe that the utilities of the Bayesian-optimal and demographic
parity selections decrease with α1. This is expected because this graph represents the average
quality of a candidate: the average quality decreases with the number of selected candidates. What
is more surprising is that the behavior of the group oblivious selection algorithm is not monotonous:
the expected utility U increases when α1 goes from 0.1 to 0.3. In fact, when α1 < 0.1, very few
B-candidates are selected by the group oblivious algorithm. When α1 > 0.1, this algorithm selects
a few good B-candidates which leads to an increased average performance.
In Fig. 4c we show the performance gap between group oblivious and demographic parity
selection algorithms for different values of σA and fixed σB = 0.2, σW = 1. The values of σA are
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Fig. 4. One-stage selection: UtilityU, selection fraction xA and performance gap (Udp −Uobl)/Uobl for
different budgets α1. The parameters are µW = 1, σW = 1, σB = 0.2, and pA = 0.4; σA = 3 for panels (a,b).
such that σA/σB = k , k = 1, 5, 10, 15. We see that the gap is in general larger when the selection
size α1 is small. This is due to the fact that as the selection size increases, the selections by the
group oblivious and demographic parity algorithms become close. The performance gap is zero
when α1 = 0.5 because the selections are exactly the same (due to the symmetry of the underlying
quality distribution), but it becomes positive again for larger values of α1. In addition, the larger
the implicit variance ratio σ 2A/σ 2B , the larger the gain that demographic parity brings.
4 TWO-STAGE SELECTION
In the previous section, we considered one-stage selection. In reality many processes are in multiple
stages, one typical example being hiring. Candidates are first evaluated using tests. After, the
examination proceeds with higher accuracy, for instance by performing an interview for every
candidate selected at first stage. In our model, first stage results are represented by low accuracy
estimatesWˆ and second stage results are the true values of qualityW . Let us recall that the first-stage
fraction of selected candidates is denoted by α1, and the second-stage fraction is α2.
As for the one-stage process, we compare the performance obtained when using at first stage
one of the algorithms introduced in Section 2.3. The selection properties of the demographic parity,
γ -rule and group oblivious algorithms are the same as for the one-stage in Section 3.1: group
oblivious tends to select a larger fraction of A-candidates if the selection size α1 is small and
a smaller fraction of A-candidates if the selection size is large. Demographic parity and γ -rule
preserve the demographics of candidates during the selection.
For a first-stage selection size α1 close to α2, we expect the two-stage selection to have a behavior
similar to one-stage. The behavior for large selection sizes is not obvious, but we expect that both
the demographic parity and group oblivious selection algorithms should give similar performance,
since there is always a chance to fix the selection at second stage because of the large first stage
selection. In fact, the following theorem shows that both for α1 close enough to α2 and for α1 large
enough, the demographic parity algorithm leads to a higher average utility than the group-oblivious
one. We believe that the case of α1 close enough to α2 is close to what would happen in a number
of real selection problems: the proportion of candidates that the decision maker is able to preselect
is not too much higher than the total amount of candidates needed.
Theorem 2. For any problem parameters, there exists α∗1 such that if α1 < α∗1 or α1 > 1/2, then
imposing a fairness mechanism at first stage improves the utilityU of the two-stage selection process:
Udp > Uγ -rule ≥ Uobl .
The above inequality is an equality when α1 = 1/2.
Sketch of Proof. Case α1 < α∗1 . We showed in Theorem 1 that for one-stage selection, de-
mographic parity always leads to a better selection. Recall that the case α1 = α2 corresponds to
one-stage selection. Thus, if α1 = α2, thenU(xdpA ) > U(xγ -ruleA ) ≥ U(xoblA ). SinceU(xdpA ),U(xγ -ruleA )
andU(xoblA ) are continuous functions of α1 (for a fixed α2), we can always find α∗1 (that may depend
on α2), such that ∀α1 < α∗1 ,U(xdpA ) > U(xγ -ruleA ) ≥ U(xoblA ) holds.
Case α1 > 1/2. This second case is harder to study. The key difficulty is to compute the first and
second derivatives ofU with respect to xA, whereU is now the expected utility of the final selection
(after selecting the candidates with the highest true quality at second stage). The expression for
d U
dxA
allows us to check whether a particular algorithm selection fraction xA is smaller or larger
than the Bayesian-optimal selection fraction xoptA . We use the expression of the demographic parity
selection fraction xdpA and substitute it into the expression of
d U
dxA
. We obtain that for α1 > 1/2,
the derivative ofU is positive, which means that xdpA < xoptA . At the same time, for α1 > 1/2, from
Lemma 3.1, we have xoblA < x
dp
A . We prove thatU is strictly concave, again using Harris inequality
[14], and thus we conclude thatUdp > Uobl. A detailed proof is provided in Appendix B.3. □
Theorem 2 provides sufficient conditions under which the γ -rule and demographic parity algo-
rithms will improve utility. To illustrate this gain, we plot in Fig. 5a the utility values obtained when
using the Bayesian optimal, demographic parity, γ -rule or group oblivious selection algorithm. We
fix the second stage selection size α2 = 0.1 and vary the first stage selection size α1 ∈ [0.1, 1].
We observe that for this example, the value of α∗1 in Theorem 2 seems to be around 0.2. For
α1 < α
∗
1 , the demographic parity or 4/5-rule algorithms provide a large gain. When α1 ∈ (0.2, 0.5),
the demographic parity and γ -rule algorithms are not as good as the group-oblivious one but the
loss of quality is minimal. The γ -rule algorithm provides a compromise between demographic
parity and group oblivious: it provides a smaller gain when demographic parity is better than group
oblivious; but it provides a smaller loss when demographic parity is not as good as group oblivious.
In Fig. 5c, we show the performance gap for different cases of implicit variance values. We
observe that in general the larger the implicit variance, the larger the gain that demographic parity
brings. The gain can be up to 40% in our experiments. In general, as the budget α1 grows, we observe
a smaller performance gap between the demographic parity and group oblivious algorithms. When
demographic parity harms the utility, the harm does not exceed 2%.
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Fig. 5. Utility of two-stage selectionU, selection fraction xA and performance gap (Udp −Uobl)/Uobl for
different budgets α1. The parameters are pA = 0.4, σB = 0.2, α2 = 0.1; σA is set to σA = 3 in (a) and (b).
5 EXPERIMENTS
In this section,6 we challenge our theoretical results by using sets of data that do not satisfy our
assumptions. We show in Section 5.1 that the results are qualitatively similar when the candidates’
true quality comes from a Pareto distribution. We also observe a similar behavior when considering
in Section 5.2 a real dataset coming from the national Indian exam data. We conclude in Section 5.3
with experiments that show that a case with n = 20 candidates behaves similarly as with n = ∞.
5.1 Synthetic data with Pareto quality
Our assumption in the theoretical evaluation of Sections 3 and 4 was that qualitiesW follow a
normal distribution. In some cases, however, the quality distribution is quite different from normal
and can be better modeled by a power law [19], this for example the case for wealth, income or
number of citations [9], meaning that a minority possesses a large fraction of the aggregate quality.
In this experiment, we suppose thatW ∼ Pareto(w0,κ), wherew0 > 0 is a scale and κ > 0 is a shape
parameter: the probability density function ofW can be written as pW (w) = κw
κ
0
wκ+1 . We generate
100 datasets of size n = 10, 000. For every dataset we perform a group oblivious and demographic
parity selection. In Fig. 6, we report the average utilities ⟨Un⟩ over the 100 experiments.
In Fig. 6a, we show the performance gap between different selection algorithms for one-stage
selection. We see that demographic parity improves the utility in most of the cases and that the
largest gap corresponds to the smallest budget α1. Note that contrary to Theorem 1, demographic
parity does not always improve utility (for instance here when α1 ∈ [.3, .5]). Yet, the loss due
to demographic parity is never larger than 0.1% while the gain can be up to 40%. In Fig. 6b, the
two-stage case is shown. As expected, demographic parity helps utility for small budgets α1 close
to α2 = 0.01, since the selection is almost the same as in one stage. As the budget α1 increases,
both the demographic parity and group oblivious selection algorithms tend to perform close to
each other due to large number of choices at the second stage. Finally, in Fig. 6c, we show how
the selection fraction xoblA depends on α1. We see that for small budgets α1, the group oblivious
algorithm tends to select more from group A, while for large budgets, the situation is opposite.
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Fig. 6. Synthetic data with Pareto distributionW ∼ Pareto(1, 3): Gain of demographic parity over group
oblivious for the one- and two-stage selections. The parameters are pA = 0.4, σB = 1, σA ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}.
Similar results are obtained for other distributions of qualityW . We consider uniform, Gaussian
mixture and beta distributions. The corresponding plots can be found in Appendix A.
5.2 IIT-JEE scores dataset
In this section, we consider a real dataset, the IIT-JEE dataset [1], with joint entrance exam results
in India in 2009. These scores are used as an admission criteria to enter the high-rated universities.
6All codes are available at: https://gitlab.inria.fr/vemelian/implicit-variance-code [permalink on softwareheritage.org].
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Fig. 7. Distribution ofW and Wˆ given gender, and one- and two-stage selection for IIT-JEE dataset [1].
Mean values and standards deviations ofW for two groups are: µWmen = 30.8, σWmen = 51.8, µWwomen = 21.2,
σWwomen = 39.3. Added noise has standard deviation σm = 10 and σw = k · σm; k = 4 in plot (b).
The dataset consists of 384,977 records. Every record has information about one student: its name,
gender, grade for Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry and total grade. In the dataset, there are 98,028
women and 286,942 men. This dataset is the same as the one considered in [7].
In order to construct a model of implicit variance, we consider an artificial scenario where the
field “grade” is the true latent qualityW of the candidates. The mean values and standard deviations
ofW for the two groups are: µWmen = 30.8, σWmen = 51.8, µWwomen = 21.2, σWwomen = 39.3. We then
suppose that an unbiased estimator Wˆ of the grade is observed at the first stage. The standard
deviation of estimation for male candidates is set to σm = 10. For the women group, which is the
minority group, we consider different cases: σw = k · σm, for k = 1, 4, 7, 10. The distribution of
gradesW and observed values Wˆ for k = 4 are shown in Fig. 7a and 7b.
We start our experiment with one-stage selection. For the dataset we perform a group oblivious
(select bestm1) and demographic parity selection (select bestm1, but maintain the demographic
parity condition xA = xB up to one candidate). The selection size varies from 2% to 100% of total
number of candidates, i.e., out of 384,977 students the decision maker selects 7,700 students or
more. A selection rate of 2% was set by IIT in 2009 [7].
The results for one-stage selection are given in Fig. 7c. We observe that for both small and large
values of α1 demographic parity helps utility, if the noise values of women evaluation σw are large.
We see that the gain can be up to around 30% if the selection size is small and up to 5% if the
selection size is large. For the case where σw and σm are close, we observe no gain if the selection
is large and we observe a minor loss in utility (around 2%) if the selection is small. This is due to
the fact that in the dataset, there are more men with a high true latent qualityW , as seen in Fig. 7a.
We now analyze two-stage selection. As for the one-stage case, we perform a group-oblivious
selection (select bestm1; then select bestm2 out ofm1) and a demographic parity selection (select
bestm1 but maintain demographic parity; then select bestm2 out ofm1). In Fig. 7d we show the
case where the final-stage selection rate is α2 = 2%, i.e., we select 7,700 candidates out of 384,977.
As observed, the performance gain when using demographic parity can be up to 20%. However,
as the selection size α1 increases,Udp andUobl become close, since there will always be enough
candidates among those selected at first stage to subselect a tiny proportion of good candidates.
5.3 Accuracy of the approximation for small n
As discussed in Section 2, we cannot solve the problem with finite selection sizes exactly. Instead,
we use an approximation that is exact as number of candidates n tends to infinity (Proposition 2.1).
However, it is important to know how the approximation behaves for a small number of candidates
n and small selection sizes m1, m2. For our experiment, we generate datasets of different sizes
n = 20, 50, 100. For every size parameter n, we generate 10, 000 different datasets. For a population
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Fig. 8. Finite population size: quality of the two-stage selection and expected gain of demographic parity
over group oblivious. The quality distributionW is Normal(1, 1) and the noise parameters are σA = 3, σB = 0.2,
α2 = 0.1. The number of experiments per set of parameters isK = 10, 000. The shaded areas are the confidence
intervals (corresponding to one standard deviation on the estimation of the empirical mean).
sizen, we denote by ⟨Un⟩ the average quality of the selected candidates over our 10, 000 experiments.
In each case, the true latent qualitiesW are generated from a normal distribution Normal(1, 1).
In Fig. 8a we plot the average utilities ⟨Un⟩ for a population of n = 100, where we selectm2 = 10
individuals and where we varym1 from 10 to 100. The shaded region corresponds to a confidence
interval. We consider two selection algorithms (demographic parity and group oblivious) and
compare the performance for n = 100 with the limiting quantitiesUdp andUobl. We observe that,
even for n = 100, the average values of utility are close to the approximation. In Fig. 8b we compare
the gap of average performances (⟨Udpn ⟩ − ⟨Uobln ⟩)/⟨Uobln ⟩ for different n. We observe that the
approximation n = +∞ is a good prediction of the average gain provided by the use of demographic
parity. In order to distinguish more precisely over the various experiments, in Fig. 8c we compare
the average gain of performance ⟨(Udpn −Uobln )/Uobln ⟩. Again, the curves for finite n are almost
indistinguishable from the case where n →∞.
6 DISCUSSION AND EXTENSIONS
In this work, we study one- and two-stage selection problems in the presence of implicit variance.
We propose a purposely simple model of the problem that captures the phenomenon of implicit
variance and allows us to obtain clean mathematical results. In particular, we show that fairness
mechanisms (a generalization of the 4/5 rule) often lead to a higher selection utility compared to
using a group oblivious algorithm. Our model is flexible and can be extended in several directions.
Different prior of the quality distribution. Our theoretical results are obtained under the assumption
that the true latent qualityW follows a group-independent distribution (to isolate the effect of
implicit variance) that corresponds to a normal law (to allow for analytical derivations). Both
assumptions can be relaxed. First, we can plug into the model any distribution of latent quality (e.g.,
Pareto, uniform, mixture of Gaussians, etc.). We show numerically in Section 5 and Appendix A
that it does not change the flavor of the main results. Second, we can consider quality distributions
dependent on the group. A natural extension in that direction would be to consider two different
normal distributions. It is possible to extend our results to that case (at the expense of increased
complexity). Our experiment on the ITT-JEE dataset (Section 5.2), however, gives a preview of how
the results are modified: if the effect of implicit variance is small compared to the difference in
the true quality distributions then demographic parity can decrease the selection quality for small
selection budgets. If the effect of implicit variance is predominant then our results continue to hold.
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Fig. 9. Selection fractionsyA andyB corresponding to selection at second stage. Parameters:W ∼ Normal(1, 1),
σA = 3, σB = 0.2, pA = 0.4 and α2 = 0.1
Combining implicit variance and implicit bias. Our model does not include implicit bias so as to
better isolate the effect of implicit variance. It is easy, though, to incorporate implicit bias as in [7, 19].
The most natural in our model would be to consider Wˆi =Wi − βGi +σGi εi , where βG is the implicit
additive bias against groupG (typically, β > 0 for the disadvantaged group and β = 0 for the other).
In effect, the additive parameter β shifts the distribution of Wˆi , while the additive noise widens it. If
true qualities are normally distributed, we would then have WˆA ∼ Normal(µW − βA,σ 2W + σ 2A) and
WˆB ∼ Normal(µW − βB ,σ 2W + σ 2B ). We leave as future work a detailed investigation of the group
oblivious and fair selection utilities in that case.
Effect on global fairness in two-stage selection. Throughout the paper, we have studied the effect
of imposing demographic parity at the first stage on the final selection utility. However, a natural
question to ask is what is the effect of imposing fairness at the first stage on the fairness (or
disparity) of the final selection (we term it global fairness following [13]). In Fig. 9, we plot the
global selection ratios yA and yB for each group (at the second stage), for the different first-stage
algorithms considered in the paper. For selection budgets α1 close to α2, we observe that the first-
stage demographic parity algorithm leads to the smallest disparity in global selection fractions.
It is natural since the selection fractions are close to ones obtained in the one-stage case (so for
demographic parity yA ≈ yB since xA = xB ). However, we observe that as α1 grows, demographic
parity can lead to a larger inequality in the global selection fractions than with the group oblivious
and optimal algorithms. Thus, in a two-stage selection problem with implicit variance, imposing a
fairness constraint at the first stage may lead to a degradation of the global fairness. We leave a
detailed investigation of this counter-intuitive aspect as future work but note that this emphasizes
the crucial importance of modeling implicit variance in multistage selection problems.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This work has been partially supported by MIAI @ Grenoble Alpes (ANR-19-P3IA-0003) and by
a European Research Council (ERC) Advanced Grant for the project “Foundations for Fair Social
Computing” funded under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Framework Programme (grant
agreement no. 789373). We thank the reviewers for their thoughtful comments.
REFERENCES
[1] 2019. IIT-JEE dataset. https://github.com/AnayMehrotra/Ranking-with-Implicit-Bias. [Online; accessed Jan 29, 2020].
[2] Dennis J. Aigner and Glen G. Cain. 1977. Statistical Theories of Discrimination in Labor Markets. Industrial and Labor
Relations Review 30, 2 (1977), 175–187.
[3] Loukas Balafoutas and Matthias Sutter. 2012. Affirmative Action Policies Promote Women and Do Not Harm Efficiency
in the Laboratory. Science 335 (Feb. 2012), 579–82.
[4] Ariane Baye and Christian Monseur. 2016. Gender differences in variability and extreme scores in an international
context. Large-scale Assessments in Education 4 (Dec. 2016).
[5] Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan. 2004. Are Emily and Greg More Employable Than Lakisha and Jamal?
A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination. American Economic Review 94, 4 (Sept. 2004), 991–1013.
[6] Marilyn Cavicchia. 2015. How to fight implicit bias? With conscious thought, diversity expert tells NABE. American
Bar Association: Bar Leader 40, 1 (2015).
[7] L. Elisa Celis, Anay Mehrotra, and Nisheeth K. Vishnoi. 2020. Interventions for Ranking in the Presence of Implicit
Bias. In Proceedings of the 2020 Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (FAT*). 369–380.
[8] Alexandra Chouldechova. 2017. Fair Prediction with Disparate Impact: A Study of Bias in Recidivism Prediction
Instruments. Big Data 5, 2 (2017), 153–163.
[9] Aaron Clauset, Cosma Rohilla Shalizi, and M. E. J. Newman. 2009. Power-Law Distributions in Empirical Data. SIAM
Rev. 51, 4 (2009), 661–703.
[10] Stephen Coate and Glenn Loury. 1993. Will Affirmative-Action Policies Eliminate Negative Stereotypes? American
Economic Review 83 (Feb. 1993), 1220–40.
[11] Brian Collins. 2007. Tackling Unconscious Bias in Hiring Practices: The Plight of the Rooney Rule. NYU Law Review
82 (June 2007).
[12] Sam Corbett-Davies, Emma Pierson, Avi Feller, Sharad Goel, and Aziz Huq. 2017. Algorithmic Decision Making and
the Cost of Fairness. In Proceedings of the 23rd ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and
Data Mining (KDD). 797–806.
[13] Vitalii Emelianov, George Arvanitakis, Nicolas Gast, Krishna Gummadi, and Patrick Loiseau. 2019. The Price of Local
Fairness in Multistage Selection. In Proceedings of the 28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
(IJCAI).
[14] C. M. Fortuin, P. W. Kasteleyn, and J. Ginibre. 1971. Correlation inequalities on some partially ordered sets. Comm.
Math. Phys. 22, 2 (1971), 89–103.
[15] Anthony Greenwald and Linda Krieger. 2006. Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations. California Law Review 94 (July
2006), 945.
[16] Moritz Hardt, Eric Price, and Nathan Srebro. 2016. Equality of Opportunity in Supervised Learning. In Proceedings of
the 30th International Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems (NIPS). 3323–3331.
[17] Harry Holzer and David Neumark. 2000. Assessing Affirmative Action. Journal of Economic Literature 38, 3 (Sept.
2000), 483–568.
[18] Sampath Kannan, Aaron Roth, and Juba Ziani. 2019. Downstream Effects of Affirmative Action. In Proceedings of the
Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (FAT*).
[19] Jon M. Kleinberg and Manish Raghavan. 2018. Selection Problems in the Presence of Implicit Bias. In Proceedings of the
9th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS). 33:1–33:17.
[20] Zachary Lipton, Julian McAuley, and Alexandra Chouldechova. 2018. Does mitigating ML’s impact disparity require
treatment disparity?. In Proceedings of the 32nd International Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems
(NIPS). 8125–8135.
[21] Francesco Locatello, Gabriele Abbati, Thomas Rainforth, Stefan Bauer, Bernhard Schölkopf, and Olivier Bachem.
2019. On the Fairness of Disentangled Representations. In Proceedings of the 33rd International Conference on Neural
Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS). 14584–14597.
[22] Michael Mathioudakis, Carlos Castillo, Giorgio Barnabo, and Sergio Celis. 2020. Affirmative Action Policies for Top-k
Candidates Selection, With an Application to the Design of Policies for University Admissions. In Proceedings of the
ACM Symposium on Applied Computing (SAC). 440–449.
[23] R. E. O’Dea, M. Lagisz, M. D. Jennions, and S. Nakagawa. 2018. Gender differences in individual variation in academic
grades fail to fit expected patterns for STEM. Nature Communications 9, 1 (2018), 3777.
[24] Christina Passariello. 2016. Tech Firms Borrow Football Play to Increase Hiring of Women. Wall Street Journal (27
Sept. 2016).
[25] Dino Pedreshi, Salvatore Ruggieri, and Franco Turini. 2008. Discrimination-aware Data Mining. In Proceedings of the
14th ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining (KDD). 560–568.
[26] Edmund Phelps. 1972. The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism. American Economic Review 62, 4 (1972), 659–61.
[27] Manish Raghavan, Solon Barocas, Jon Kleinberg, and Karen Levy. 2020. Mitigating Bias in Algorithmic Hiring:
Evaluating Claims and Practices. In Proceedings of the 2020 Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency
(FAT*). 469–481.
[28] Muhammad B. Zafar, Isabel Valera, Manuel Gomez Rodriguez, and Krishna P. Gummadi. 2017. Fairness Beyond
Disparate Treatment & Disparate Impact: Learning Classification Without Disparate Mistreatment. In Proceedings of
the 26th International Conference on World Wide Web (WWW). 1171–1180.
[29] Muhammad B. Zafar, Isabel Valera, Manuel Gomez Rogriguez, and Krishna P. Gummadi. 2017. Fairness Constraints:
Mechanisms for Fair Classification. In Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and
Statistics (AISTATS). 962–970.
[30] Rich Zemel, Yu Wu, Kevin Swersky, Toni Pitassi, and Cynthia Dwork. 2013. Learning Fair Representations. In
Proceedings of the 30th International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML). 325–333.
A ADDITIONAL PLOTS
As was mentioned in Section 5, we perform our study on different prior distributions ofW . In
Section 5, we studied the Pareto case. In this section, we show the selection results for other
distributions: Uniform, Gaussian mixture and Beta distribution.
The most interesting case is a two component Gaussian mixture, where with probability π = 0.2
there appears a “good” candidate, and with probability 0.8 appears a “bad” candidate. This is a
typical situation where only small proportion of candidates are “suitable” for the selection. We set
selection budget α2 = 0.1, which means that we aim to select only candidates from the second peak.
Parameters of this mixture are as follows: µ1 = 0.0, µ2 = 0.2, σ1 = σ2 = 0.05.
While performing one-stage selection, we vary the selection budget α1 from 0.1 to 1. In two-
stage selection, we fix α2 = 0.1 and vary α1 from α2 to 1. The implicit variance for B-candidates
is fixed to σB = 0.1, the implicit variance for A-candidates varies with k = 1, 2, 3, 4 as σA = kσB .
Parameters pA = 0.4 and pB = 0.6.
On top row of Figure 10, we plot corresponding pdfs, on middle row we show the result for
one-stage selection and on bottom row, the two-stage selection is displayed. We observe that the
demographic parity selection outperforms the group oblivious algorithm in one-stage selection
for small and large α1. In two-stage selection, demographic parity is also better than the group
oblivious algorithm for values α1 close α2, while for α1 ≫ α2, both tend to perform similarly.
B OMMITED PROOFS
In this section we provide detailed proofs of the statements given before. Namely, these are proofs
of Lemma 3.1, Lemma 3.2 and Theorem 2.
B.1 Proof of Lemma 3.1
The distribution ofW is common for both groups and follows a normal law with parameters µW
and σ 2W . The noise ε is centered normal, thus, Wˆ =W + εσG follows a normal law with parameters
µWˆ |G = µW and σ 2Wˆ |G = σ
2
W + σ
2
G .
The selection fraction xoblG is, by definition, the probability to observe aG-candidate withWˆ larger
than θˆobl (where θˆobl = θˆoblA = θˆ
obl
B since the thresholds are the same in the group-oblivious selection
algoritm). Thus, xoblG = P(Wˆ ≥ θˆobl |G) = Φc
(
θˆ obl−µW√
σ 2G+σ
2
W
)
. Recall that to shorten the notation, we
write P(Wˆ ≥ θˆobl |G) for P(Wˆi ≥ θˆobl |Gi = G).
Now, we consider three different cases:
(1) if α1 < 1/2, then θˆobl > µW and θˆ
obl−µW√
σ 2A+σ
2
W
<
θˆ obl−µW√
σ 2B+σ
2
W
;
(2) if α1 = 1/2, then θˆobl = µW and θˆ
obl−µW√
σ 2A+σ
2
W
=
θˆ obl−µW√
σ 2B+σ
2
W
= 0;
(3) if α1 > 1/2, then θˆobl < µW and θˆ
obl−µW√
σ 2A+σ
2
W
>
θˆ obl−µW√
σ 2B+σ
2
W
.
The functionΦc is decreasing with its argument, thus the statement of lemma is a direct consequence
of the above inequalities.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 3.2
The following lemma is necessary to study the optimal one-stage selection. The proof of it is
technical and we postpone it to Section B.4.
Lemma B.1 (Derivatives of One-Stage UtilityU). For any α1, where 0 < α1 ≤ 1, we have
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Fig. 10. One- and two-stage selection results for different prior distributions of qualityW . The implicit
variance for B-candidates is fixed to σB = 0.1, the implicit variance for A-candidates varies with k = 1, 2, 3, 4
as σA = kσB . We set n = 1, 000 and average over 100 experiments.
(1) d UdxA =
pA
α1
[
θˆA ·σ 2W +µW ·σ 2A
σ 2W +σ
2
A
− θˆB ·σ 2W +µW ·σ 2Bσ 2W +σ 2B
]
;
(2) d
2 U
dx 2A
< 0,
where θˆA and θˆB are such that{
P(WˆA ≥ θˆA |G = A) = xA,∑
G ∈{A,B } P(Wˆ ≥ θˆG |G) · P(G) = α1.
The result in Lemma B.1 helps to obtain several insights about the optimal one-stage selection.
From the condition on a maximum d UdxA = 0, we obtain that optimal quantiles θˆ
opt
G should satisfy
θˆ
opt
G = C · (σ 2W + σ 2G ) + µW for some C that does not depend on the group G. Since Wˆ |G follows a
normal law with parameters µWˆ |G = µW , σ 2Wˆ |G = σ
2
G + σ
2
W , the selection probability x
opt
G can be
written as xoptG = P(Wˆ ≥ θˆoptG |G) = Φc
(
θˆ optG −µW√
σ 2W +σ
2
G
)
. Using the expression for optimal quantiles, we
obtain xoptG = Φ
c
(
C ·
√
σ 2W + σ
2
G
)
.
Now, three cases are possible:
(1) If θˆoptG < µW , thenC < 0. As a result, using the expression for x
opt
G , we obtain that x
opt
A > x
opt
B .
(2) If θˆoptG > µW , then C > 0. Hence, x
opt
A < x
opt
B .
(3) If θˆoptG = µW , then C = 0 and x
opt
A = x
opt
B = 1/2.
Since pAxoptA + pBx
opt
B = α1, then x
dp
A is a convex combination of x
opt
A and x
opt
B . Thus, x
dp
A < x
opt
A for
θˆ
opt
G < µW , x
dp
A > x
opt
A for θˆ
opt
G > µW and x
dp
A = x
opt
A for θˆ
opt
G = µW .
B.3 Proof of Theorem 2
The following lemma is necessary to study the optimal two-stage selection. Due to the technicality
of its proof, we postpone it to Section B.5.
Lemma B.2 (Derivatives of Two-Stage UtilityU). For any α1, α2, where 0 < α2 ≤ α1:
(1) d UdxA =
1
α2
pA
[
σˆA
∫ (µˆA−θ )/σˆA
−∞ Φ(τ )dτ − σˆB
∫ (µˆB−θ )/σˆB
−∞ Φ(τ )dτ
]
, where
µˆG =
µW σ
2
G + θˆGσ
2
W
σ 2G + σ
2
W
, σˆ 2G =
σ 2Gσ
2
W
σ 2G + σ
2
W
;
(2) d
2 U
dx 2A
< 0,
where θˆA, θˆB and θ are such that
P(WˆA ≥ θˆA |G = A) = xA,∑
G ∈{A,B } P(Wˆ ≥ θˆG |G) · P(G) = α1,∑
G ∈{A,B } P(Wˆ ≥ θˆG ,W ≥ θ |G) · P(G) = α2.
The proof proceeds as follows. First, we show that for α1 > 1/2, we have xoptA > xdpA . Then, using
Lemma 3.1, we have xdpA > x
obl
A for α1 > 1/2. Using the property that xoblA < xdpA < xoptA , we conclude
that there exists λ ∈ (0, 1), such that xdpA = λxoblA + (1 − λ)xoptA . By strict concavity of two-stage
selection utility, we obtain
U
(
x
dp
A
)
= U
(
λxoblA + (1 − λ)xoptA
)
> λU
(
xoblA
)
+ (1 − λ)U
(
x
opt
A
)
> U
(
xoblA
)
.
Hence, to complete the proof we need to show that xoptA > x
dp
A for α1 > 1/2, which we do in the
next few paragraphs.
The random variableWˆ |G follows a normal lawwith parameters µWˆ |G = µW andσ 2Wˆ |G = σ
2
G+σ
2
W .
Hence, the threshold θˆdpG = F
−1
Wˆ |G (1 − α1) can be simplified to θˆ
dp
G = µW +
√
σ 2W + σ
2
G · Φ−1(1 − α1).
By using the expression forU ′ from Lemma B.2 and substituting θˆdpG into it, we obtain
U ′(xdpA ) =
1
α2
pA
(
σˆA
∫ (µˆA−θ )/σˆA
−∞
Φ(τ )dτ − σˆB
∫ (µˆB−θ )/σˆB
−∞
Φ(τ )dτ
)
,
where µˆG = µW +
Φ−1(1−α1)·σ 2W√
σ 2W +σ
2
G
and σˆG =
σ 2Gσ
2
W
σ 2G+σ
2
W
. As a result, µˆA − θ > µˆB − θ for Φ−1(1 − α1) <
0 ⇐⇒ α1 > 1/2. Thus,U ′(xdpA ) ≥ I (σˆA) − I (σˆB ), where I (σ ) = σ
∫ I0/σ
−∞ Φ(τ )dτ for some I0 ∈ R.
We can show that the function I (σ ) is increasing for any value of I0 by looking at its first
derivative:
I ′σ =
∫ I0/σ
−∞
Φ(τ )dτ + σΦ
(
I0
σ
) (
− I0
σ 2
)
=
I0
σ
Φ
(
I0
σ
)
+ ϕ
(
I0
σ
)
− I0
σ
Φ
(
I0
σ
)
= ϕ
(
I0
σ
)
> 0 .
Thus, for demographic parity selection,U ′(xdpA ) > 0. Due to concavity ofU, we obtain xoptA > xdpA ,
which concludes the proof.
B.4 Proof of Lemma B.1
In this section, we provide a proof of Lemma B.1. We prove it in general setting, i.e. qualityW
follows any general distribution having a probability density function pW (w).
The one-stage selection can be viewed as a two-stage selection where we select all candidates
at second stage. This corresponds to setting the second-stage threshold to θ = −∞. Writing
V(θˆA, θˆB ) = V(θˆA, θˆB ,−∞) by abuse of notation, the one-stage utilityU is defined as
U(xA) = V(θˆA, θˆB ),
with θˆA, θˆB such that
{
P(Wˆ ≥ θˆA |G = A) = xA,∑
G ∈{A,B } P(Wˆ ≥ θˆG |G) · P(G) = α1.
For a general prior distribution of the qualityW , the quantities we study can be expressed as
V(θˆA, θˆB ) = 1
α1
∑
G
pG
∫
θˆG
dwˆ
∫
dw w · pW (w) · 1
σG
ϕ
(
w − wˆ
σG
)
,
P(WˆG ≥ θˆG |G) =
∫
θˆG
dwˆ
∫
dw pW (w) · 1
σG
ϕ
(
w − wˆ
σG
)
= xG (θˆG ),
where pW (w) is a probability density function of the distribution of qualityW . The symbol
∫
here represents the integration over all support of the corresponding probability density function
pW (w), unless the limits are specified. We prove the following statement about the derivatives of
the one-stage utilityU.
Lemma (Derivatives ofU). For the one-stage selection utilityU, we have
dU
dxA
=
pA
α1

∫
w · pW (w) · 1σAϕ
(
w−θˆA
σA
)
dw∫
pW (w) · 1σAϕ
(
w−θˆA
σA
)
dw
−
∫
w · pW (w) · 1σB ϕ
(
w−θˆB
σB
)
dw∫
pW (w) · 1σB ϕ
(
w−θˆB
σB
)
dw
 ; (5)
d2U
dx2A
< 0, (6)
where θˆA and θˆB are such that{
P(WˆA ≥ θˆA |G = A) = xA,∑
G ∈{A,B } P(Wˆ ≥ θˆG |G) · P(G) = α1.
First Derivative ofU. Using the parameterization by xA, we can write
dU
dxA
=
∑
G
∂V
∂θˆG
dθˆG
dxA
.
From the first stage constraint pAxA + pBxB = α1,
pA
dxA
dxA
+ pB
∂xB
∂θˆB
dθˆB
dxA
= 0 =⇒ dθˆB
dxA
= −pA
pB
∂θˆB
∂xB
.
Then d UdxA = pA
(
∂V
∂θˆA
∂θˆA
∂xA
− ∂V
∂θˆB
∂θˆB
∂xB
)
from which (5) follows directly.
Second Derivative of U. The second derivative of U with respect to xA, then can be written as
d2 U
dx 2A
=
∑
G
∂Z
∂θˆG
d θˆG
dxA
, where byZ we denote the expression (5). Using (5), we conclude that
∂Z
∂θˆG
=
−
∫
w · pW (w) ·
(
θˆG−w
σ 2G
)
1
σG
ϕ
(
w−θˆG
σG
)
dw
∫
pW (w) 1σG ϕ
(
w−θˆG
σG
)
dw
α1
(∫
pW (w) 1σG ϕ
(
w−θˆG
σG
)
dw
)2
+
∫
w · pW (w) 1σG ϕ
(
w−θˆG
σG
)
dw
∫
pW (w) ·
(
θˆG−w
σ 2G
)
1
σG
ϕ
(
w−θˆG
σG
)
dw
α1
(∫
pW (w) 1σG ϕ
(
w−θˆG
σG
)
dw
)2 .
If we use the notation dP = pW (w) 1σG ϕ
(
w−θˆG
σG
)
dw , then
∂Z
∂θˆG
=
−
∫
w(θˆG −w)dP ·
∫
dP +
∫
wdP ·
∫
(θˆG −w)dP
α1σ
2
G
(∫
dP
)2
=
∫
w2dP ·
∫
dP −
∫
wdP ·
∫
wdP
α1σ
2
G
(∫
dP
)2 = 1α1σ 2G
[ ∫
w2dP∫
dP
−
∫
wdP∫
dP
·
∫
wdP∫
dP
]
.
Since f (w) = w2 and д(w) = w are increasing functions ofw , then by applying Harris inequality
[14] to f , д and probability measure dµ = dP/
∫
dP , we obtain∫
w2dP∫
dP
−
∫
wdP∫
dP
·
∫
wdP∫
dP
> 0 .
Hence, the second derivative ofU with respect to xA can be written as
d2U
dx2A
= pA
dθˆA
dxA
∂Z
∂θˆA
− pAdθˆB
xA
∂Z
∂θˆB
= pA
∂θˆA
∂xA
∂Z
∂θˆA
+
p2A
pB
∂θˆB
∂xB
∂Z
∂θˆB
< 0.
B.5 Proof of Lemma B.2
In this section, we provide a proof of Lemma B.2. We also prove it in general setting, i.e. qualityW
follows any general distribution having a probability density function pW (w).
The two-stage utility is
U(xA) = V(θˆA, θˆB ,θ ),
with θˆA, θˆB ,θ such that

P(WˆA ≥ θˆA |G = A) = xA,∑
G ∈{A,B } P(Wˆ ≥ θˆG |G) · P(G) = α1,∑
G ∈{A,B } P(Wˆ ≥ θˆG ,W ≥ θ |G) · P(G) = α2.
For a general prior distribution of the qualityW , the quantities we study can be written as
V(θˆA, θˆB ,θ ) = 1
α2
∑
G
pG
∫
θˆG
dwˆ
∫
θ
dw w · pW (w) · 1
σG
ϕ
(
w − wˆ
σG
)
,
P(Wˆ ≥ θˆG |G) =
∫
θˆG
dwˆ
∫
dw pW (w) · 1
σG
ϕ
(
w − wˆ
σG
)
= xG (θˆG ),
P(Wˆ ≥ θˆG ,W ≥ θ |G) =
∫
θˆG
dwˆ
∫
θ
dw pW (w) · 1
σG
ϕ
(
w − wˆ
σG
)
= yG (θˆG ,θ ),
wherepW (w) is a probability density function of the distribution of the qualityW . The symbol
∫
here
represents the integration over all support of the corresponding probability density function pW (w),
unless the limits are specified. We want to prove the following statement about the derivatives of
the two-stage utilityU.
Lemma (Derivatives ofU). For the two-stage utilityU, we have
dU
dxA
=
pA
α2
©­­«
∫
θ (w − θ ) · pW (w) · 1σAϕ
(
w−θˆA
σA
)
dw∫
pW (w) · 1σAϕ
(
w−θˆA
σA
)
dw
−
∫
θ (w − θ ) · pW (w) · 1σB ϕ
(
w−θˆB
σB
)
dw∫
pW (w) · 1σB ϕ
(
w−θˆB
σB
)
dw
ª®®¬ ; (7)
d2U
dx2A
< 0, (8)
where θˆA, θˆB and θ are such that
P(WˆA ≥ θˆA |G = A) = xA,∑
G ∈{A,B } P(Wˆ ≥ θˆG |G) · P(G) = α1,∑
G ∈{A,B } P(Wˆ ≥ θˆG ,W ≥ θ |G) · P(G) = α2.
First Derivative ofU. Using the parameterization by xA, d UdxA can be written as
dU
dxA
=
∑
G
∂V
∂θˆG
dθˆG
dxA
+
∂V
∂θ
dθ
dxA
.
From the first stage constraint pAxA + pBxB = α1:
pA
dxA
dxA
+ pB
∂xB
∂θˆB
dθˆB
dxA
= 0 =⇒ dθˆB
dxA
= −pA
pB
∂θˆB
∂xB
.
From second stage budget constraint y := pAyA + pByB = α2, we get∑
G
pG
∂yG
∂θˆG
dθˆG
dxA
+
∂y
∂θ
dθ
dxA
= 0 =⇒ dθ
dxA
= −
(
∂y
∂θ
)−1∑
G
pG
∂yG
∂θˆG
dθˆG
dxA
.
Hence,
dU
dxA
= pA
(
∂V
∂θˆA
∂θˆA
∂xA
− ∂V
∂θˆB
∂θˆB
∂xB
)
−
(
∂y
∂θ
)−1
pA
(
∂yA
∂θˆA
∂θˆA
∂xA
− ∂yB
∂θˆB
∂θˆB
∂xB
)
∂V
∂θ
= pA
[
∂θˆA
∂xA
(
∂V
∂θˆA
− ∂V
∂θ
∂θ
∂y
∂yA
∂θˆA
)
− ∂θˆB
∂xB
(
∂V
∂θˆB
− ∂V
∂θ
∂θ
∂y
∂yB
∂θˆB
)]
.
Let us consider the following quantity:
∂θˆG
∂xG
(
∂V
∂θˆG
− ∂V
∂θ
∂θ
∂y
∂yG
∂θˆG
)
=
1
α2
∫
θ wpW (w) 1σG ϕ
(
θˆG−w
σG
)
dw∫
pW (w) 1σG ϕ
(
θˆG−w
σG
)
dw
−
∫
θ pW (w) 1σд ϕ
(
θˆG−w
σG
)
dw∫
pW (w) 1σG ϕ
(
θˆG−w
σG
)
dw
·
1
α2
∑
д pG
∫
θˆG
θpW (θ ) 1σG ϕ
(
wˆ−θ
σG
)
dwˆ∑
д pG
∫
θˆG
pW (θ ) 1σG ϕ
(
wˆ−θ
σG
)
dwˆ︸                                           ︷︷                                           ︸
=θ
=
1
α2
∫
θ (w − θ ) · pW (w) · 1σG ϕ
(
w−θˆG
σG
)
dw∫
pW (w) · 1σG ϕ
(
w−θˆG
σG
)
dw
.
Equation (7) follows directly from the expression developed above.
Second Derivative ofU. The second derivative ofU with respect to xA, then can be written as:
d2U
dx2A
=
∑
G
∂Z
∂θˆG
dθˆG
dxA
+
∂Z
∂θ
dθ
dxA
,
where byZ we denote the expression (7). Then, by using (7), we can calculate
∂Z
∂θ
= 0;
∂Z
∂θˆG
=
−
∫
θ (w − θ ) · pW (w) ·
(
θˆG−w
σ 2G
)
1
σG
ϕ
(
w−θˆG
σG
)
dw
∫
pW (w) 1σG ϕ
(
w−θˆG
σG
)
dw
α2
(∫
pW (w) 1σG ϕ
(
w−θˆG
σG
)
dw
)2
+
∫
θ (w − θ ) · pW (w) 1σG ϕ
(
w−θˆG
σG
)
dw
∫
pW (w) ·
(
θˆG−w
σ 2G
)
1
σG
ϕ
(
w−θˆG
σG
)
dw
α2
(∫
pW (w) 1σG ϕ
(
w−θˆG
σG
)
dw
)2 .
Using the notation dP = pW (w) 1σG ϕ
(
w−θˆG
σG
)
dw , we get
∂Z
∂θˆG
=
−
∫
θ (w − θ )(θˆG −w)dP ·
∫
dP +
∫
θ (w − θ )dP ·
∫
(θˆG −w)dP
α2σ
2
G
(∫
dP
)2
=
∫
θ (w2 − θw)dP ·
∫
dP −
∫
θ (w − θ )dP ·
∫
wdP
α2σ
2
G
(∫
dP
)2
=
1
α2σ
2
G
[ ∫
w · (w − θ ) 1w ≥θ dP∫
dP
−
∫
(w − θ ) 1w ≥θ dP∫
dP
·
∫
wdP∫
dP
]
.
Since f (w) = w and д(w) = (w − θ ) · 1w ≥θ are increasing functions ofw , then by applying Harris
inequality [14] to f , д and probability measure dµ = dP/
∫
dP , we obtain:∫
w · (w − θ ) 1w ≥θ dP∫
dP
−
∫
(w − θ ) 1w ≥θ dP∫
dP
·
∫
wdP∫
dP
> 0 .
Then, the second derivative ofU with respect to xA can be written as
d2U
dx2A
= pA
dθˆA
dxA
∂Z
∂θˆA
− pAdθˆB
xA
∂Z
∂θˆB
= pA
∂θˆA
∂xA
∂Z
∂θˆA
+
p2A
pB
∂θˆB
∂xB
∂Z
∂θˆB
< 0.
